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Chapter Eight
A Legal Framework for
Targeted Killing

Amos N. Guiora
Monica Hakimi

Introduction
It is preferable to capture suspected ten-orists where feasible-among other reasons, so that we can gather valuable
intelligence from them; but we must also recognize that there
are instances where our government has the clear authority-and, I would argue, the responsibility-to defend the
United States through the appropriate and lawful use of lethal force. . . . The unfortunate reality is that our nation
will likely continue to face terrorist threats that, at times,
originate with our own citizens. When such individuals take
up arms against this country and join al Qaeda in plotting
attacks designed to kill their fellow Americans, there may
be only one realistic and appropriate response. 1
-Attorney General Eric Holder, February 27, 2012
Holder ... [has] argued that the Executive Branch, alone,
should determine whether te due process requirement is satisfied when the government claims law of war or self-defense authority to kill. In a system of constitutional checks
and balances, that simply cannot be the case. Courts must
I. Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Speech at Northwestern
University School of Law (Feb. 27, 2012).
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have a role in determining whether the government's authority to kill its own citizens is legal and whether a decision
to kill complies with the Constitution. Otherwise. the government can wield the power to take life with impunity. We
should not trust any president-whether this one or the nextto make such momentous decisions fully insulated from judicial review. 2
-ACLU statement responding to Holder
•

Since 2004. the United States has conducted roughly 300
counte11errorism drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan. and
other areas. 3

Targeted Killing:
Lawful if Conducted in Accordance with
the Rule of Law
Amos N. Guiora

T

he drone attack that killed Anwar al-Awlaki has been the
subject of innumerable articles, commentaries. and public
discussion. The fact Al-Awlaki is an American citizen has
dramatically increased the public scrutiny of the drone policy initiated by President George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 and significantly enhanced by President Barack Obama. The discussion is
healthy and essential in large part because drone warfare will play an
increasingly important role in the future of operational
counterterrorism.
From the perspective of the nation-state, the benefits of targeted
killing are clear: aggressive measures against identified targets with
2. Nathan Wesler, In Targeted Killing Speech, Holder Mischaracteri~es Debate
Over Judicial Review, ACLU, March 5, 2012 (https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity/targeted-ki Iii ng-specch-hol dcr- mi scharactcri zcs-dcbate-o vcr-j udici alreview ).
3. The Year of the Drone, CouNlTRTERRORISM STRATl'GY fNITIATIVE, March 13,
2012 (http://counterterrorism.ncwamcrica.net/droncs ).
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minimal, if any, risk to soldiers for the obvious reason that the killings are conducted from an unmanned aerial vehicle. While the risks
to soldiers are minimal, there are other risks that are not insignificant. Particularly. there is always the risk of collateral damage, and
there are also legitimate concerns regarding how a target is defined
as legitimate.
While I believe the Al-Awlaki killing lawful, I am deeply troubled
by the broad rationale articulated by the Obama Administration. Yes,
the Al-Awlaki killing reflects aggressive self-defense coupled with a
respect for the obligation to minimize collateral damage. However, the
Administration failed to aiticulate exactly how, beyond mere speech.
Al-Awlaki was connected to terrorist activity. The mere '•likelihood"
of membership in a terrorist organization is highly problematic.
The essence of targeted killing. arguably the most aggressive
form of operational counterterrorism, is killing an individual the
nation-state has identified as posing a danger to national security,
and there is no alternative, in the name of national security, but to
kill the individual. The decision must reflect a rigorous application
of "checks" to ensure that the decision is neither arbitrary nor in
violation of international law and core principles of morality in armed
conflict.
I am a firm believer in the nation-state's right to engage in aggressive. preemptive self-defense subject to powerful restraints and
conditions. I advocate a measured, cautious approach to targeted killing with the understanding that the nation-state has the absolute rightand obligation-to protect its civilian population. However. that absolute right does not translate into an unlimited right.
After all, conducting operational counterterrorism divorced from
a balanced approach results in violations of international law obligations, violates principles of morality in armed conflict, and results in
policy ineffectiveness. The challenge in the targeted killing paradigm is to identify the specific individual deemed a legitimate target
and to implement the policy in a manner reflecting respect for international law.
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At its core. targeting killing reflects aggressive self-defense.
Needless to say, neither the policy (in principle) nor its application
(in specific) is controversy-free or immune to criticism. In the seminal case regarding targeted killings, the Israel Supreme Court sitting
as the High Court of Justice held:
The approach of customary international law applying to
armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians
arc protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians "for such ti me
as they take a direct part in hostilities''(§ 51 (3) of The First
Protocol). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death,
is permitted, on the condition that there is no other less harmful means. and on the condition that innocent civilians nearby
are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportionate.
That proportionality is detennined according to a values based
test. intended to balance between the military advantage and
the civilian damage. As we have seen. we cannot determine
that a preventative strike is always legal, just as we cannot
determine that it is always illegal. All depends upon the question whether the standards of customary international law
regarding international armed conflict allow that preventative strike or not.-1
Active self-defense (in the form of targeted killing). if properly
executed, not only enables the state to more effectively protect itself
within a legal context but also leads to minimizing the loss of innocent civilians caught between the teJTorists (who regularly violate
international law by using innocents as human shields) and the state.
Active self-defense aimed at the ten-orist must contain an element
of "pinpointing'" so that the state will attack only those terrorists who
are directly threatening society. The first step in creating an effective
counterterrorism operation is analyzing the threat, including the na4. Public Committee Against Tmturc in Israel, Palestinian Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment v. The Government of Israel, and
others. HCJ 769/02, 40.
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ture of the threat, who poses it, and when it is likely to be carried out.
It is crucial to assess the imminence of any threat. which significantly
impacts the operational and legal choices made in response.
To ensure both the legality and morality of drone strikes, I propose the following standards:

1. A target must have made significant steps directly conttibuting to a planned act of terrorism.

2. An individual cannot be a legitimate target unless intelligence action indicates involvement in future acts of
terrmism.

3. Before a hit is authorized, it must be determined that the
individual is still involved and has not proactively disassociated from the original plan.

4. The individual's contiibution to the planned attack must
extend beyond mere passive support.
5. Verbal threats alone are insufficient to categorize an individual as a legitimate target.
The significant advantage of active self-defense-subject to recognized restraints of fundamental international law principles-is
that the state can act against terrorists who present a real threat prior
to the threat materializing (based on sound, reliable, and corroborated intelligence information or sufficient criminal evidence) rather
than reacting to an attack that has already occurred.
While there is much disagreement among legal scholars as to the
meaning (and, subsequently, timing) of words such as "planning to
attack,'' the doctrine of active self-defense enables the state to undertake all operational measures required to protect itself.
Lawful targeted killing must be based on criteria-based decision
making, which increases the probability of correctly identifying and
attacking the legitimate target. The state's decision to kill a human
being in the context of operational counterterrorism must be predi-
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cated on an objective determination that the "targef' is, indeed, a
legitimate target. Otherwise, state action is illegal, immoral, and ultimately ineffective. It goes without saying that many object to the
killing of a human being when less lethal alternatives are available to
neutralize the target.
Any targeted killing decision must reflect consideration of four
distinct elements: law, policy, morality, and operational considerations. Traditional warfare once pitted soldier against soldier, plane
against plane, tank against tank, and warship against warship.
Present and future asymmet1ic conflict reflects state engagement
with non-state actors. In the targeted-killing paradigm, the questions-who is a legitimate target and when is the target legitimateare at the core of the decision-making process. How both questionsin principle and practice alike-are answered determines whether
the policy meets international law obligations.
The dilemma of the decision maker in the targeting paradigm is
extraordinary; the time to make the decision is short, limited, and
stress-filled. After all. national secu1ity is at stake. However, not all
individuals identified as posing threats to national security are indeed
those persons. A criteria-based decision-making model is necessary to
ensure that the identified target is, indeed, the legitimate target.
Any use of force under international law must meet a four-part
test: (1) It must be proportionate to the threat posed by the individual;
(2) collateral damage must be minimal; (3) alternatives have been
weighed, considered, and deemed operationally unfeasible; and (4)
military necessity justifies the action. In addition, all these principles
build on the fundamental international law principle of distinction,
which requires that any attack distinguish between those who are fighting
and those who are not in order to protect innocent life.
Regardless of whether a target is legitimate, if an attack fails to
satisfy the requirements listed above, it will not be lawful. Thus, the
Israeli Special Investigatory Commission 5 examining the targeted

5. http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/Spokcsman/2011/02/
spokeshchade2702 l I .htm (last vi,ited March 8, 2011 ).
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killing of Saleh Shehadah concluded that although the targeting of
Shehadeh-head of Hamas 's Operational Branch and the driving force
behind many terrorist attacks-was legitimate, the extensive collateral damage caused in the attack was disproportionate.
In any targeted killing decision, three important questions must
be answered: First. can the target be identified accurately and reliably? Second, does the threat the target poses justify an attack at that
moment or are there alternatives? And. finally, what is the extent of
the anticipated collateral damage?
To answer these questions using the criteria-based process, extensive intelligence must be gathered and thoroughly analyzed. The
Intelligence Community receives information from three different
sources: human (such as individuals who live in the community about
which they are providing information to an intelligence officer),
signal intelligence (such as intercepted phone and e-mail conversations), and open sources (the Internet and newspapers, for example).
One of the most important questions in putting together an operational '"jigsaw puzzle" is whether the received information is "actionable," that is, does the information warrant a response? This question is central to the criteria-based method, or at least to a process
that seeks-in real time-to create objective standards for making
decisions based on imperfect information (as almost all intelligence
is). It is essential that intelligence information. particularly from
humans, be subjected to rigorous analysis.
Targeted killing is a legitimate and effective form of active selfdefense provided that it is conducted in accordance with clear international law principles and a narrow definition of legitimate target;
otherwise. it reflects state action bound neither by the rule of law nor
constraints of morality. Morality and legality demand that operational counterterrorism measures reflect criteria-based decision making. otherwise the stakes and the price are too high.
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A Functional Method for Defining the
Authority to Target
Monica Hakimi

I agree with much of what Professor Amos Guiora says, but I disagree with the method he uses to get there. And I believe the method
matters. Guiora assesses targeting operations under an "active selfdefense" paradigm, with elements from both thejus ad bellwn (the
law governing the use of force) and thejus in bello (the law governing the conduct of hostilities). Under Guiora·s paradigm. a state may
target terrorism suspects in anticipatory self-defense if: (I) targeting
is proportional to their threat; (2) collateral damage is minimized;
(3) alternatives to targeting are infeasible; and (4) military necessity
justifies the action. Guiora does not explain why that paradigm is the
correct one.
In fact. the ad bellum rules on defensive force probably do not
govern Guiora's poster-child case-the U.S. operation targeting
Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. Thejus ad bellum does not constrain the
use of force by one state in another state where that second state
consents. Yemen appears to have consented to the operation against
Al-Awlaki. Moreover. neither the jus ad bellwn nor the traditional
jus in bello requires a state to consider alternatives to lethal forceGuiora's third criterion-if someone is a legitimate target. Finally.
though Guiora argues that someone·s membership in al Qaeda is an
insufficient basis for targeting him, many in bello experts treat membership in an organized armed group as dispositive. Rather than reflect existing law, then. Guiora ·s model is some kind of ''hybrid.'' He
has presented his own normative vision on when targeting should be
lawful.
I assume that Guiora developed that hybrid because he believes
that the traditional wartime paradigm--designed for interstate warsis poorly suited for the fight against al Qaeda. Similarly. I assume
that Guiora rejects international law's presumptive alternative-applying human rights law-because he believes that it. too, is inapposite. The human rights norms on targeting were developed for law
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enforcement settings. They would prohibit operations that Guiora
would permit. For example, human rights law generally prohibits a
state from targeting someone who is not on the verge of killing.
Guiorn does not require that kind of imminent threat. But Guiora
does not explain why his model is preferable to the alternatives. Why
should decision makers assess targeting operations using his four
criteria, instead of applying the conventional wartime paradigm, the
law enforcement paradigm of human rights law, or a hybrid advanced by someone else?
In other work, I argue that the current method for assessing targeting operations-which requires first identifying the correct legal
paradigm and then applying the norms as specified for that paradigm-is misguided. 6 The method presumes that international law's
different paradigms operate independently and sometimes incompatibly. But as I demonstrate, three core principles animate all the international law on targeting: the }us in hello for combatants, the }us in
hello for civilians, and human rights law.
•

•

The liberty-security principle identifies the outer bounds of
permissible state action. The security benefits of containing
someone's threat must be proportional to or outweigh the
costs of life. Targeting usually satisfies that principle if the
person poses an active threat of death or serious bodily injury. In that event, the security benefit of containing the
threat (protecting life or limb) is proportional to the liberty
cost (taking life).
The mitigation principle fmther restricts the authority to
target by requiring states to try to lessen the liberty costs.
States must try to contain threats using reasonable, nonlethal alternatives to targeting-most obviously, capture and
detention. Reasonableness here depends primarily on two
factors. One is the level of state control. The more control

6. See Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and Detention,
REV._ (forthcoming 2012).

110 Mr(:i-1. L.
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•

the state has, the more reasonable it will be to capture the
suspect. The second factor is the relative efficacy of that
alternative. States need not try to capture someone if doing
so might compromise a security mission or fail to mitigate
the liberty costs.
The mistake principle requires states to try to verify that: ( 1)
the person being targeted (2) poses a sufficiently serious
threat (3) that cannot reasonably be contained less intrusively. In other words, the state must exercise due diligence
to avoid mistakes and establish a reasonable, honest belief
that its conduct is lawful. That diligence is generally less
when states act in the heat of the moment than with time for
deliberation. With time, states have more opportunity to ensure the accuracy of their assessments and consider the alternatives.

Those three principles govern all targeting operations but require different results depending on the facts. They may lead to results that Guiora would support. My liberty-security principle is similar to his proportionality criterion. My mitigation principle is like
his criterion that states consider alternatives to targeting. And though
none of his criteria specifically addresses mistakes, Guiora argues
that states must gather and thoroughly analyze intelligence to ensure
the accuracy of their operations. In substance, then, we seem to agree
on quite a bit-at least at this level of generality. (My method does
not address the permissible collateral damage. J agree with Guiora
that, consistent with both thejus in hello and human rights law, any
collateral damage must be minimized.)
But methodologically, we differ. I argue for assessing all targeting operations by reference to the above three principles. Most international lawyers invoke their preferred legal paradigm-Guiora selects a hybrid for "active self-defense"-and then apply the norms
associated with that paradigm. As I demonstrate in my other work,
that latter method breeds uncertainty and undermines the discursive
process by which the law might adapt to modern challenges or hold
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decision makers accountable. 7 It breeds uncertainty because decision
makers sometimes disagree on the governing paradigm even when
they agree in substance. Agreeing on the paradigm for one case may
threaten slippery-slope implications for other cases. Or it may require a hybrid that, like Guiora's, is not accessible under existing
law. Debating the applicable paradigm obscures areas of substantive
agreement.
More importantly, my method would focus decision makers on
the considerations that actually drive legal outcomes. Decision makers now justify particular outcomes by invoking their prefeffed paradigms. Those who disagree on the applicable paradigm talk past each
other, applying different norms to assess the same or similar conduct. That enfeebled discourse is a problem because international
law-and especially the law on targeting-primarily operates discursively. When the legal process works well, it provides a common
language with which decision makers may justify their positions and
respond to counterarguments. Eventually, they may converge on particular outcomes and resolve substantive uncertainties. But even when
they disagree on substance, the discursive process helps constrain
their discretion. The more persuasively an actor defends its position,
the less pressure it confronts to alter its conduct. Conversely, the
more compelling the counterarguments, the more it must change its
behavior or refine its position to avoid condemnation.
Consider the Al-Awlaki case. The U.S. government justifies that
and similar operations by invoking a global armed conflict against al
Qaeda. It claims that the jus in hello for traditional combatants also
governs operations against members of al Qaeda. The United States
makes that claim, even though it does not intend to target al Qaeda
members worldwide. Rather, it claims a global conflict, because it
views the presumptive alternative-applying human rights law wherever U.S.-al Qaeda hostilities are not active-as sometimes too limiting. Hybrids such as Guiora's might be normatively appealing but
are not now grounded in existing law. Thus, the method for assessing
7. Id.
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targeting operations pushes the United States toward a legal position
that is more extreme than its practice. Meanwhile, those who protest
the U.S. practice lack effective tools for holding it accountable. Just
as the wartime paradigm is ineffective in legitimizing U.S. operations, the law enforcement paradigm is ineffective in constraining
those operations. The United States easily dismisses human rights
law as inapplicable. Of course, the Al-Awlaki operation fits neatly
into none of the existing paradigms. But because the current method
requires identifying the co1Tect paradigm before assessing state conduct, decision makers endlessly debate which of those ill-fitting options is preferable.
By contrast, my method invites the United States to defend its
operations on the merits-by reference to the p1inciples that animate
all existing law. Compromise positions may satisfy U.S. security
needs while better legitimizing its operations internationally. The
United States clearly seeks to do both. Here is President Obama's
chief counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan:
The effectiveness of our counterteITorism activities depends
on the assistance and cooperation of our allies .... But their
participation must be consistent with their laws. including
their interpretation of international law.... The more our
views and our allies' views on these questions converge, without constraining our flexibility, the safer we will be as a
country. 8
Whereas the current method pushes the United States toward the
extreme armed-conflict claim, mine would encourage more moderation-which the United States itself seeks. Over time, the United
States and other actors may narrow their disagreements and resolve
when states may target terrorism suspects extraterritorially. For example, although the United States and Human Rights Watch disagree
8. John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Countcrterrorism. Strengthening our Security /Jy Adhering to our Values and Laws.
Speech at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security ( Sept. 16. 2011 ).
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on the applicable legal paradigm, they seem to agree that the AlAwlaki operation was permissible in part because capture was infeasible. Yet even where substantive disagreements persist, my method
would better hold the United States accountable. It would require the
United States to defend its conduct on the merits, instead ofby reference to opaque legal paradigms. Some positions-such as the claim
that it may target all al Qaeda members-would be considerably
more difficult to defend.

Targeted Killing: Reply to Monica Hakimi
Amos N. Guiora

To the naked eye, Professor Monica Hakimi and I agree: Targeted
killing is lawful provided it is subject to criteria and standards. Perhaps we reach this conclusion from different perspectives and distinct analysis, but the conclusion is similar. In other words, targeted
killing is legal; the question is under what conditions. A close reading of Professor Hakimi's thoughtful and well-written response to
my initial essay suggests concern with my analysis of imminence; in
other words, how do we determine whether the threat posed is sufficiently imminent to determine that the potential target is, indeed, a
legitimate target.
Professor Hakimi is spot-on in highlighting this issue. Similarly,
she is correct in suggesting that my essay proposes a rearticulation of
international law to account for a new operational model. There is,
frankly, discomfort in proposing new models; ad hoc solutions are
inherently dangerous because their limits are unclear. In that vein. as
history continuously suggests, unlimited executive power in the face
of threats raises deeply important questions and concerns.
That said, to apply traditional models to new threats is similarly
problematic; the challenge is implementing proactive operational
measures subject to rigorous checks and balances with narrow definitions of ctitical terms. As much discussed in scholarly literature on
war and international law-and as Professor Hakimi correctly notesthe term imminence is elusive, problematic, and subject to wide in-
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terpretation. Imminence, in the targeted killing paradigm, suggests
that unless the nation-state decisively engages a particular individual
deemed to pose a direct threat, then innocent civilians will be harmed.
For example. to successfully conduct a suicide bombing requires
a doer (the bomber), a sender (responsible for the operation in all
parameters), a logistician (responsible for all operational logistics),
and a financier (responsible for financing the attack. whether directly or indirectly). All four actors are essential, individually and
collectively.
The proactive self-defense model at the core of targeted killing
requires determining when each actor is a legitimate target predicated on an imminence analysis. Too broad a definition violates international law and morality in armed conflict standards; too natTow
a definition unnecessarily endangers innocent civilians to whom the
nation-state owes a duty to protect. Based on international law principles of military necessity and proportionality, along with the requirement to minimize collateral damage and to pursue alternatives,
the four actors are legitimate targets at distinct times.
The doer is a legitimate target when about to commit a suicide
bombing; the sender is a legitimate target 24/7 regardless of specific
actions at the moment provided collateral damage is minimized; the
logistician is a legitimate target when involved in planning an attack.
with the understanding that continued involvement poses a greater
threat to national security than the doer of a specific attack; the financier, while largely an unresolved dilemma. is a legitimate target
more akin to the sender than to the logistician and immeasurably
more so than the doer. After all, financiers are to terrorism what
intelligence information is to counterte1rnrism. There is no ten-orism without financiers and there is no counterterrorism without intelligence information.
Where, then, does this leave us with respect to the questions
Professor Hakimi posed? While recommending new paradigms is
inevitably a risky proposition, the core question is whether the nation-state has the requisite tools to effectively engage in aggressive
self-defense against an amorphous target. Professor Hakimi and I
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agree that an overbroad definition of a legitimate target is a dangerous road to travel. Similarly, we agree that standardless targeted killing models not predicated on well-defined criteria pose an extraordinary danger to the rule of law and morality standards. Nevertheless,
while debate is important-particularly given the dangers inherent
to excessive state power-it is important to cut to the chase.
To that end, the working model proposed above for defining
both the legitimate target categmies and when those targets may be
legitimately engaged suggests a way forward. While inevitably subject to criticism and concern, it reflects a balancing approach required by international law in a conflict that I have previously referred to as ·'mission impossible." After all, identifying a legitimate
target in the traditional war paradigm posed minimal challenges to
operational decision makers; defining a legitimate target in the state/
non-state paradigm poses extraordinary challenges. Targeted killing
is the most aggressive form of self-defense; in the present paradigm,
its morality, legality, and effectiveness demand narrow definitions of
legitimate target strictly applied. That is the model I have proposed.
How criteria-based decision making is applied determines whether
the nation-state conducts itself in accordance with international law.

Targeted Killing: Reply to Amos Guiora
Monica Hakimi

In our first round of debate, Professor Guiora proposed assessing
targeting operations using a model of '"active self-defense." I presented a counterproposal. I argued that certain basic principleswhich I term liberty-security, mitigation, and mistake-determine
when targeting is lawful.
Substantively, our proposals have much in common. They also
have some differences. For example, Guiora asserts that states may
target people who only finance terrorism. My liberty-security principle probably prohibits that result. Financiers do not themselves
threaten bodily integrity and are too removed from the harm to justify targeting them.
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No matter how one assesses those substantive differences, my
proposal is preferable to Guiora's because mine is methodologically
sound. First, my proposal is rooted in existing law. Its three principles drive settled outcomes under both the }us in hello and human
rights law. In contrast, Guiora's model reflects his own normative
vision. Second, my principles apply in all contexts. Guiora does not
identify precisely when his model applies, but he apparently intends
for it to apply in only some contexts. He did not contest my suggestion that. before using his model, decision makers would have to
determine whether it even applies. Third and as explained in my
initial response, my proposal would invigorate international law's
discursive process. Rather than debate which targeting model applies, decision makers would focus on the considerations that actually drive legal outcomes. That substantive discourse helps develop
the law and hold decision makers accountable.
Thus far, our debate has focused on the in belfrJ and human rights
restraints on targeting. Targeting sometimes also implicates thejus
ad helium. The }us ad hellum regulates when states may use force
against non-state actors in other states. Such force is lawful when the
territorial state consents. It probably also is lawful when the territorial state is unable or unwilling to contain the non-state threat.
Since the September 11 attacks, states have more frequently used
force to incapacitate terrorists in other states-either with consent or
under the unable-or-unwilling standard. Those operations may be
lawful under the }us ad bellum without falling squarely in any in
bello or human rights paradigm. For example, one-off operations
might not cause sufficient violence to trigger an armed conflict. The
}us in hello would not apply. Similarly, human rights law might not
apply. The extent to which it applies extraterritorially is contested
and uncertain. Thus, some lawyers suggest that the ad bellwn license
to use force effectively displaces any in bello or human rights restraints. I disagree (and I presume from Guiora's comments that he
would disagree, as well). The }us ad he/lum is concerned primarily
with protecting state sovereignty. Thejus in bello and human rights
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law are about protecting individuals. Both interests are at stake when
states use force extraterritorially.
In my view, decision makers must adapt the in hello and human
rights protections to account for developments under the jus ad bellum.
My proposal enables that move. Recall that my mitigation principle
requires states to pursue reasonable, nonlethal alternatives to targeting. Reasonableness here depends on two factors. One is state control. The greater a state's control, the more varied its toolbox, and
the more comfortably it may contain a threat without resorting to
deadly force. The second factor is the relative efficacy of an alternative. States need not pursue measures that are unsuitable for or realistically might compromise the security mission.
The fact that an operation is lawful under the jus ad bellum does
not make it so under my proposal. Capture might be reasonable-and
therefore required-even if the territorial state consents to military
force. States usually must cooperate to apprehend terrorists with the
tools of law enforcement. Yet the circumstances that justify
nonconsensual force might also justify taking human life. Capture might
be unreasonable when the territorial state is unable or unwilling.
Consider the U.S. operation against Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan
did not consent to that operation. The }us ad bell um asks whether
Pakistan was unable or unwilling to incapacitate Bin Laden-for
example, because of incompetence or corruption. If Pakistan was
unable or unwilling, then working with its law enforcement apparatus was almost certainly unreasonable for purposes of the mitigation
principle. To be sure, the United States might have had other alternatives for containing Bin Laden's threat. But the mitigation principle
suggests that, if the territo1ial state is uncooperative, the targeting
state should have more than its ordinary, law enforcement authorities. The United States had considerably fewer tools for controlling
the situation in Abbottabad than it has domestically.
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